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This paper examines the determination of long-run movements in nom-
inal exchange rates across countries. We model the long-run movement
in the nominal exchange rate as depending on (i) the long-run in‡ation
di¤erential; and (ii) the long-run change in the real exchange rate. We ar-
gue that the former depends on country characteristics such as openness,
country size, the level of outstanding government debt and central bank
independence and the latter on the rate of economic growth and the terms
of trade. Empirical support for both channels is provided, suggesting the
fruitfulness for the analysis of exchange rates of studying cross-sectional
cross-country data.
Acknowledgements
This work was begun while I was on the faculty at Columbia Univer-
sity. I am grateful to an anonymous referee, participants in the New
York University international seminar and the Columbia Macro Lunch for
comments. Marta Campillo and Je¤rey Miron kindly provided some data.
Views expressed belong solely to the author and do not necessarily re‡ect
the opinion of the Department of Economics of Trinity College Dublin.Section I: Introduction
This paper examines the determination of long-run movements
in nominal exchange rates across countries. This issue is interesting and
important for a number of reasons. First, explaining the long-run behavior
of currencies is illuminating for those interested in tracking the evolution
of the global economy. Second, an understanding of what determines
long-run changes in the nominal exchange rate is potentially helpful to
investors comparing expected returns on medium- or long-term nominal
bonds denominated in di¤erent currencies. Third, modelling the long-
run behavior of the exchange rate is the underpinning for even analysis
of the short-run behavior of exchange rates: it is necessary to know the
long-run in order to work out whether a given exchange rate movement
is a deviation from its long-run path or represents convergence towards
the long-run value of the exchange rate. Finally, long-run movements in
exchange rates are less prone to the “noise” that is present in higher-
frequency exchange rate data and hence may be more easily related to
the fundamental determinants indicated by theory.
The basis for this paper is that unmodi…ed purchasing power
parity (PPP) in itself may not be an optimal model of the long-run nom-
inal exchange rate. This is the case for three reasons. First, the long-run
real exchange rate may not be a constant: for instance, a fast-growing
economy may experience a long-run appreciation of its real exchange rate
due to di¤erential productivity growth in the traded and nontraded sec-
tors. Second, in‡ation rates may contain both long-run and short-run
components. In‡ation can vary from its long-run value due to business
1cycle factors, temporary ‘mistakes’ or policies that shift in‡ation from
the present to the future.1 In this case, the PPP practice of identifying
the long-run nominal exchange rate with the current in‡ation di¤erential
(controlling for any long-run in the real exchange rate) may be mislead-
ing. Third, if the long-run in‡ation rate is important in determining the
long-run rate of change in the nominal exchange rate, this only begs the
question of what determines the long-run in‡ation rate.
Accordingly, the approach in this paper is to model the long-run
movement in the nominal exchange rate as depending on (i) the long-run
in‡ation di¤erential; and (ii) the long-run change in the real exchange
rate. As such, this approach builds on the recent literature that has
modelled long-run in‡ation in a Barro-Gordon policy game setting and
derived theoretical and empirical results linking long-run in‡ation to vari-
ables such as trade openness, country size, central bank independence,
political stability and government debt.2 In extending this approach to
nominal exchange rate determination, due attention has to be paid to
the possibility of long-run movement in a country’s real exchange rate.
To see that this consideration is important, consider an economy that is
growing rapidly and so faces a long-run appreciation of its real exchange
rate. If its target in‡ation rate is low, its nominal exchange rate must be
allowed to appreciate in order to reconcile low long-run in‡ation with real
appreciation.
1For instance, the government may run an excessively tight …scal policy or adopt a
temporary exchange rate peg. See Sargent and Wallace (1981), Calvo (1986) and Tornell
and Velasco (1995).
2See Romer (1993), Lane (1997) and Campillo and Miron (1997).
2Japan presents a good example. Prior to the collapse of the
Bretton Woods …xed exchange rate system, the positive long-run in its
real exchange rate resulted in relatively high in‡ation; subsequently, with
a ‡oating nominal exchange rate, it was able to attain low in‡ation by
o¤setting the in‡ationary pressure generated by real appreciation with a
robust rate of nominal exchange rate appreciation.3 In this paper, as a
…rst step, we model the long-run change in the real exchange rate in a
fairly simple fashion, focusing on productivity growth and changes in the
terms of trade as forces that drive the real exchange rate.
As noted above, long-run in‡ation can be modeled as the out-
come of a Barro-Gordon game between the government and the public.4
In this class of model, the focus is on the time-consistent rational expec-
tations equilibrium in‡ation rate. A key result is that the greater is the
incentive to in‡ate, the higher will be long-run in‡ation. The incentive to
in‡ate is increasing, for instance, in the seigniorage needs of the govern-
ment and in the payo¤ to surprise monetary expansion. For example, the
former will be greater, all else equal, the greater is the stock of outstanding
nominal government debt.5 If the government cares about social welfare,
the latter will depend on the real income e¤ect of an increase in output
that is generated by a monetary surprise and on the extent of distor-
tions in the economy. From the analysis developed by Romer (1993) and
Lane (1997), these factors are less important in more open and smaller
3Over 1962-70, Japan’s average annual in‡ation rate was 5.8 percent; over 1974-92,
it was signi…cantly lower at 3.8 percent.
4See Barro and Gordon (1983).
5See also Campillo and Miron (1997).
3economies, which suggests that long-run in‡ation will be lower in such
economies. Finally, following Rogo¤ (1985), it is well understood that
appointing a central bank governor that is perceived to gain less from
in‡ation than the government can reduce the equilibrium in‡ation rate.
As is discussed in section 2.3, economic growth and movement in
the terms of trade are potentially important factors in the determination
of the long-run in the real exchange rate. It is a robust stylised fact that
richer countries have higher relative price levels (eg, see Kravis and Lipsey
1983). A dynamic corollary is that if country i is growing more rapidly
than the benchmark country, this will be associated with appreciation of
country i’s real exchange rate. If domestic tradable goods have a greater
weight in the domestic price level than in the price level of the benchmark
country (and conversely), then an improvement in the terms of trade
also translates into a real appreciation. It follows that a country that is
enjoying a long-run improvement in its terms of trade will also experience
a long-run appreciation in its real exchange rate.
From this account of the determination of long-run in‡ation and
the long-run change in the real exchange rate, it is possible to derive an
expression for the long-run movement in the nominal exchange rate as a
function of a set of country characteristics. The preceding discussion indi-
cates that this set of country characteristics include openness, size, extant
government debt, output growth, terms of trade movements and the de-
gree of central bank independence. Such an expression for the long-run in
the nominal exchange rate is useful because it allows us to obtain estimates
for long-runs in nominal exchange rates from cross-country cross-sectional
4data. The major part of this paper consists of an attempt to perform this
empirical implementation.
Previewing the empirical results, we …nd evidence in support of
both in‡ation and real exchange rate factors in determining the rate of
growth of the nominal exchange rate. Openness and the stock of nominal
government debt — variables that a¤ect the propensity to in‡ate — are
signi…cant in explaining the long-run rate of nominal depreciation. The
evidence on another in‡ation variable — country size — is mixed and
the data do not support a signi…cant role for central bank independence,
controlling for these other factors, in determining the rate of nominal
exchange rate depreciation. The output growth rate — which a¤ects the
long-run in the real exchange rate — also is important in explaining the
long-run movement in the nominal exchange rate. However, the results for
the terms of trade, another factor that ought a¤ect the nominal exchange
rate via its in‡uence on the real exchange rate, are mixed. For the OECD,
the factors driving in‡ation appear to dominate the determination of the
nominal exchange rate, even though the real exchange rate does in fact
signi…cantly comove with the output growth rate and the terms of trade in
the OECD subsample. These …ndings suggest the potential fruitfulness for
empirical analysis of exchange rates from studying cross-sectional cross-
country data.
The empirical literature on nominal exchange rate determination
has focused mostly on the high-frequency behavior of exchange rates or on
statistical approaches to characterizing the long-run in nominal exchange
5rates for a small set of industrial countries.6 However, Obstfeld (1995)
follows a similar empirical approach to that in this paper in the sense
that he allows both the in‡ation di¤erential and productivity growth to
a¤ect the nominal exchange rate in a cross-section of OECD economies.
As mentioned above, the work that is mostly closely related to this paper is
the analysis of cross-country determinants of long-run in‡ation contained
in Romer (1993), Lane (1997) and Campillo and Miron (1997).
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2
provides a background theoretical discussion. The empirical analysis is
contained in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Section II: The Model
In this section, we lay out a simple theoretical framework that
is helpful in clarifying the determinants of the long-run behavior of the
nominal exchange rate. In particular, it is useful to decompose the long-
run movement in the nominal exchange rate into its constituent parts: the
long-run in‡ation di¤erential and the long-run change in the real exchange
rate. As our focus is on long-run behavior, we are able to abstract from
factors that only have short-run e¤ects on the nominal exchange rate.
6See the recent comprehensive survey by Frankel and Rose (1995).
6A : Basic Framework
By construction, the price level of country i is linked to the price




where pi is the price level of country i, Ei is the nominal exchange rate de-
…ned as the number of units of country i’s currency per unit of the currency
of the benchmark country (an increase in Ei is a nominal depreciation of
the currency of country i), p¤ is the price level of the benchmark country
and Ri is the real exchange rate (an increase in Ri is a real depreciation).
In log …rst di¤erences, this expression can be rewritten as
¼i = ¼E




i = ¼i ¡ ¼¤ + ¼R
i (2)
where ¼E
i is the rate of nominal depreciation, ¼i is the rate of in‡ation
in country i, ¼¤ is the in‡ation rate of the benchmark country and ¼R
i is
the rate of real exchange rate depreciation. According to equation [2], the
rate of nominal depreciation is faster, the higher is country i’s in‡ation
rate relative to that of the benchmark country and the faster is its rate
of real depreciation. This expression is useful because, as was outlined
in the introduction, there exist economic theories of long-run in‡ation
and real exchange rate determination. It follows that if we can determine
country i’s equilibrium long-run in‡ation rate and the long-run change in
7its real exchange rate, we have an implicit account of what determines the
movement in its nominal exchange rate. It remains to determine the rates
of in‡ation and real depreciation. In the next subsection, we address the
former problem; in subsection 2.3, we analyze long-run real exchange rate
determination.
B : In‡ation Determination
We follow the tradition of the literature initiated by Barro and
Gordon (1983) by focusing on the determination of the time-consistent
long-run equilibrium in‡ation rate. According to this approach, the equi-
librium in‡ation rate will be increasing in the attractiveness of expected
and unexpected in‡ation. As our focus is on the long-run in‡ation rate,
we abstract from cyclical factors in the determination of in‡ation.
Even anticipated in‡ation can be attractive to a government if
it desires seigniorage revenues. A government will rely more heavily on
the in‡ation tax, the greater are its desired expenditures and the fewer
are the alternative sources of tax revenue. For instance, the government’s
need for in‡ation tax revenue will be the greater, the larger is the stock
of outstanding public debt.
Turning to the bene…ts of unanticipated in‡ation, a surprise
monetary expansion in‡ation may increase the level of output and em-
ployment in the economy, in the presence of nominal price or wage rigid-
ity. This will be more attractive to a government that cares (directly or
indirectly) about social welfare, the greater is the e¤ect on real income of
an increase in output and the less socially e¢cient is the ‘natural’ level
8of output. Romer (1993) notes that the real income e¤ect of an increase
in domestic output will be smaller, the more open is an economy. The
reason is that the adverse terms of trade e¤ect of increasing the domes-
tic output of tradables has a larger impact on the consumer price index
in a more open economy, reducing the real income gain from increasing
domestic production. Lane (1997) argues that more open economies are
more e¢cient and hence the government in an open economy has less to
gain from raising output above its natural level. For both these reasons,
the payo¤ to surprise in‡ation is plausibly negatively related to the level
of trade openness of an economy. In addition, the terms of trade e¤ect
highlighted by Romer is presumably more important, the larger is the
economic size of a country, so that the gain to surprise in‡ation is also
likely decreasing in the size of a country. Finally, unexpected in‡ation is
attractive to the government if it has outstanding nominal debt, because
it reduces the real value of this debt.
These factors notwithstanding, institutional reform can reduce
the equilibrium in‡ation rate by making it harder for a government to
pursue a discretionary monetary policy. For instance, as has been sug-
gested by Rogo¤ (1985) and others, the government may choose to dele-
gate monetary policy to an independent central bank. This can result in a
lower equilibrium in‡ation rate if, for instance, the government appoints a
‘conservative’ central bank governor that places a greater weight on price
stability versus reducing unemployment than does the government.7
7See Rogo¤ (1985). Alternatively, the government may write a contract with the cen-
tral bank governor that imposes a penalty on her that is increasing in the rate of in‡ation
(see Walsh 1995). Another option would be to give the central bank an explicit in‡ation
9Accordingly, this line of work suggests that the level of outstand-
ing government debt, the openness and economic size of a country and
the degree of central bank independence are among the factors that may
help to determine the long-run in‡ation rate and hence, for a given trend
in the real exchange rate, the long-run rate of nominal exchange rate
depreciation. These variables will be empirically examined in section 3
below.
C : Real Exchange Rate Determination
The other piece of the puzzle is to determine the long-run rate of
real depreciation ¼R
i . We focus on two forces that may drive movements
in the real exchange rate. One is the relative rate of output growth, which
shifts a country’s relative income level. The other is a long-run change in
its terms of trade.
A positive relationship between relative price levels and rela-
tive income levels has long been recognised (Balassa 1964, Samuelon
1964, Kravis and Lipsey 1983). One potential explanation is the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis that long-run movement in the real exchange rate
is largely driven by di¤erential productivity growth in the traded and
nontraded sectors.8 Another is provided by Bhagwati (1984): a rising
capital-labour ratio changes the product mix in the traded sector towards
target and to impose a quadratic cost for deviating from that target (see Svensson 1997).
8See Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Chapter 4). De
Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), Asea and Mendoza (1994) and Canzoneri, Cumby
and Diba (1998) provide evidence that the relative price of nontradables in terms of
tradables is driven by di¤erential productivity growth between the two sectors but the
explanatory power for the real exchange rate is much weaker, at least among the OECD
set of economies.
10more capital-intensive goods, raising economy-wide wages and the relative
price of (labour-intensive) nontraded goods. Bergstrand (1991) points
out that non-homothetic preferences which generate an income elasticity
of demand greater than one for nontradables can also help explain the
positive dependence of the price level on income.
An improvement in a country’s terms of trade mechanically leads
to an appreciation in its real exchange rate if there is home bias in the
consumption of tradables.9 In this case, an improvement in a country’s
terms of trade will appreciate its real exchange because domestic tradables
enter with a greater weight in the domestic consumer price index than
in the consumer price index of the benchmark country. To the extent
that demand factors matter for the trend in the real exchange rate, an
improvement in the terms of trade could also appreciate the real exchange
rate via a wealth e¤ect on the demand for nontraded goods.
D : Nominal Exchange Rate Determination
From the discussion in the last two subsections, we rewrite the
nominal exchange rate equation [2] as
¼E
i = ¼(zi) ¡ ¼¤ + ¼R(gi;g¤;¼TTi)
where gi and g¤ are the home and foreign growth rates respectively and
¼TTi is the growth rate of the terms of trade, or
¼E
i = ¼E(zi;gi;¼TTi;¼¤;g¤) (3)
9Tre‡er (1995) makes the case that home bias in consumption is required to explain
trade patterns and volumes.
11This equation for the long-run change in the nominal exchange rate is
useful because it expresses the nominal exchange rate as a function of a set
of country characteristics. As discussed in section 2.2, zi may include the
level of outstanding government debt, the openness and size of country i
and the degree of central bank independence in country i. The growth rate
and the terms of trade also matter because they alter the real exchange
rate and hence, for a given in‡ation rate, the nominal exchange rate.
Section III: Empirics
A : Speci…cation
We will work with a linear approximation to [3]
¼E
i = ® + ¯ ¤ zi + °1 ¤ gi + °2 ¤ ¼TTi + ²i i = 1:::N (4)
where the N + 1th country is the benchmark country. The estimating
procedure is ordinary least squares, with robust standard errors. As our
focus is on the long-run movement in the nominal exchange rate and on
country characteristics, the appropriate estimation framework is a cross-
section of countries for the period 1974-92. The description of exchange
rate determination in the previous section clearly does not properly apply
to the Bretton Woods system that preceded this time period. The end
point of 1992 is chosen in order to maximize the number of countries for
which data on key variables is available. The US is chosen as the bench-
mark country. The US dollar is a major vehicle currency for international
trade, with many international prices quoted in dollars, and hence this
12seems a natural choice.10 The alternative of using a weighted average
of the in‡ation rates of country i’s trading partners would be computa-
tionally burdensome for the sample size in this study. Note that, in a
cross-section, it is not necessary to actually compute each variable as a
di¤erential with respect to the benchmark country, as the values for the
benchmark country would just enter as constants across the observations.
B : Data
Data on the nominal exchange rate and in‡ation are taken from
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. Output, popula-
tion and openness variables are taken from version 5.6 of the Summers-
Heston Penn World Tables data set. The growth rate G is the average per
capita output growth rate over 1974-1992. The openness measure is the
average ratio of exports plus imports to GDP over 1974-1992.11 Country
size is proxied by total GDP in 1974. The debt variable, the ratio of gov-
ernment debt to GDP in 1975, is taken from Campillo and Miron (1995).
The index of legal central bank independence is from Cukierman, Webb
and Neyapti (1992). Terms of trade data are from the World Bank’s World
Tables. The set of countries that lack autonomous exchange rate policies,
which will be excluded from a number of the regressions, is compiled from
the IMF’s Exchange Rate Arrangements and Practices and Obstfeld and
10The choice of benchmark country is less important in a cross-section than in time
series or panel data analysis. This is because any common movement of the benchmark
currency against the other currencies just shows up in the intercept term: in time series
or panel analysis, a temporary common ‡uctuation in the benchmark currency generates
non-spherical residuals.
11A volume-based measure of trade openness clearly has its limitationsbut it is di¢cult
to think of superior alternatives that would be available for a large sample of countries.
13Rogo¤ (1995). Data on war involvement and the black market premium
are taken from Bruno and Easterly (1995).
C : Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for some of the key variables
in the data set. The average currency depreciation against the US dollar
over 1974-92 was 12.3 percent. However, there is a lot of variation around
this mean: at one extreme, Argentina had an average annual currency
depreciation rate of 131.7 percent; at the other, the Japanese yen appre-
ciated against the US dollar at an average annual rate of 4.89 percent.
Table 2 reports the …fteen countries that experienced nominal apprecia-
tion against the US dollar. Six are European, of which four are basically
pegged to the DM(Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands).12 Three
are oil-rich countries (Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates). In ad-
dition, there are three fast-growing East Asian economies in this group:
Japan, Taiwan and Singapore.
Table 3 reports the eighteen countries that experienced average
annual depreciation rates over 1974-92 in excess of 30 percent. The mean
depreciation rate among these countries is 60 percent. The list is domi-
nated by countries that have undergone hyperin‡ations or endured chronic
high in‡ation. Latin America is strongly represented in this group, led
by Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua, each with annual depreciation rates
above 100 percent. There are also seven African countries on the list.
Only two countries that were members of the OECD during this period
12Luxembourg has a currency union with Belgium.
14— Israel and Turkey — are in this high-depreciation category.
Finally, in Table 4, we report the thirty one countries that did
not have autonomy over monetary or exchange rate policy during this
period. This group includes the members of the CFA zone in French
West Africa and countries that have maintained currency boards or tight
unilateral exchange rate pegs to other countries. It is unclear whether the
model applies to these countries. We can think of a country adopting an
exchange rate peg for two kinds of reasons. One is to implement its desired
monetary policy: such a country may simply possess characteristics that
would generate an equilibrium depreciation rate equal to that of its anchor
country or a peg may be a kind of institutional reform to “tie the hands”
of the government in its choice of an in‡ation rate. The other is when the
peg is adopted for non-monetary reasons: eg, the CFA zone pegging to
the Franc as part of a complex post-colonial relationship with France that
also involves cheap debt …nancing and preferential trading arrangements
or small “tourist economies” that are so reliant on international trade
that an independently ‡uctuating currency would be too costly in terms
of microeconomic ine¢ciency. For these countries, we can think of the peg
as being compelling for non-monetary reasons and so their in‡ation rate
and depreciation rate against the dollar (for a given change in the real
exchange rate) is given to them by their anchor country. Accordingly,
rates of in‡ation and nominal depreciation for these countries are not
linked to the factors that are the focus of this study and the peggers are
excluded from a number of speci…cations.
15D : The Nominal Exchange Rate
For descriptive purposes, the nominal depreciation rate is plot-
ted against the in‡ation di¤erential with the US in Figure 1. As is clear
from the graph, over the full sample of countries, there is a strong cor-
respondence between nominal depreciation and in‡ation. This indicates
that the factors driving the long-run in in‡ation are of high importance
in explaining exchange rate movements. Indeed, a regression of the nomi-
nal depreciation rate on the in‡ation di¤erential generates a coe¢cient of
0:996 and an ¹ R2 = 0:98 (see Table 5, column (1)). However, the strength
of the purchasing power parity relationship may be overstated by the in-
clusion of the high-depreciation/high-in‡ation countries. In column (2)
of Table 5, the countries with annual depreciation rates above 80 percent
are excluded, which marginally reduces the explanatory power of in‡a-
tion. Moreover, if the set of countries with depreciation rates above 30
percent are excluded, the ¹ R2 falls to 0:76; if the sample is further re-
stricted to countries with depreciation rates below 10 percent, the ¹ R2 falls
yet further to 0:61 and the coe¢cient on the in‡ation di¤erential falls to
0:867(see Table 5, columns (3)-(4)). This evidence for the subsamples that
exclude the high-depreciation countries indicates that there is also consid-
erable variation in real exchange rate movements in the sample. Finally,
in column (5), the sample is restricted to the set of OECD countries. The
PPP relationship appears particularly strong in this subsample. Scatter
diagrams for the full sample, the sample excluding countries with depre-
ciation rates above 30 percent and for the OECD are presented in Figures
1-3.
16In Table 6, the most basic version of equation [4] is estimated.
The righthand side variables are openness, country size, the per capita
output growth rate and the growth rate of the terms of trade.13 According
to the theoretical arguments outlined in section 2, the former two variables
are important because they in‡uence a country’s propensity to in‡ate,
while the latter two variables enter because they a¤ect the rate of real
exchange rate depreciation.14 Both openness and country size are entered
in logs, in order to adjust for the presence of a small number of countries
with very high values for these variables. In column (1), the full sample of
countries is included. Openness, the output growth rate and the terms of
trade enter with the expected signs and are signi…cant. Finally, we note
that country size is insigni…cant in this speci…cation.
In column (2), the countries with non-autonomous monetary and
exchange rate policies are excluded from the regression. The results are
basically unchanged but the size of the growth and terms of trade ef-
fects increase slightly. The countries with depreciation rates above 30
percent are dropped from the sample in column (3). One reason to ex-
clude these countries is to guard against reverse causality from high in-
‡ation/depreciation to growth: Barro (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1998)
and Sarel (1996) each …nd that in‡ation is negatively related to growth
13It might be objected that output growth is endogenous to the in‡ation environment.
This is most likely to be true at high rates of in‡ation. We adjust for this problem in
some later speci…cations by excluding the set of countries with high rates of nominal
depreciation/in‡ation.
14Lane (1997) and Campillo and Miron (1997) con…rm that in‡ation performance is af-
fected by both openness and country size. In section 3.4, we show that the output growth
rate and the change in the terms of trade help explain real exchange rate movements.
17at high rates of in‡ation but not at lower in‡ation rates.15 In this regres-
sion, each of the regressors is signi…cant, with the exception of the terms
of trade. As a robustness check, column (4) replicates column (2), but
with the exclusion of countries that were involved in a war for at least
three years during the sample.16 These countries are excluded because
wars often involve price and other controls and may proxy for poor data.
Openness, growth and the terms of trade are signi…cant in this regression.
In column (5), countries that experienced a large change in the black mar-
ket foreign exchange premium over the sample period are also excluded. A
good example is Iran: in 1974, its black market premium was -0.1 percent;
in 1992, it was an extraordinary 3360 percent! As is evident from Figure
4, apart from these outliers, black market exchange rates and o¢cial ex-
change rates track each other quite well. In this regression, the openness
e¤ect is slightly weaker but the results are generally similar to column
(4). Finally, in column (6), the sample is restricted to the set of OECD
countries. Consistent with the PPP evidence in Table 5, the growth rate
and the terms of trade are insigni…cant in this regression. However, both
openness and country size are signi…cant. The evidence from Table 6,
then, provides initial support for the model outlined above, with both in-
15Instrumental variables estimation is inappropriate given the lack of strong instru-
ments for output growth and the knowledge that non-instrumentation is superior to
using weak instruments (almost every variable employed in growth regressions is either
plausibly endogenous or is only relatively weakly correlated with growth). As Hall and
Jones (1997) have pointed out, the level of income per capita plausibly has good instru-
ments (eg, distance from Equator, main language spoken, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
in the population) but not the growth rate — indeed, they argue that this should redirect
economists from studying growth rates to studying di¤erences in income levels across
countries.
1625 countries fall into this category.
18‡ation and real exchange rate factors typically proving important for the
determination of the nominal exchange rate.
Two additional variables are added to the speci…cation in Table
7. One is the initial stock of outstanding government debt, expressed as a
ratio to GDP. As discussed in section 2.2, a country that has a larger stock
of government debt will be more prone to in‡ate, both as a source of tax
revenue and because its eroding e¤ect on the real value of the debt raises
the payo¤ to unexpected in‡ation. The other is the index of legal central
bank independence developed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
If an independent central bank is more insulated from political pressures
to in‡ate, this variable should have a negative e¤ect on in‡ation. As
pointed out by Barro (1995), a legal measure is less prone to the criticism
that it is endogenous to in‡ation performance than alternatives, such as
the rate of turnover of the central bank governor.
In column (1), the full sample, subject to data availability, is in-
cluded. Openness, size, growth and debt are signi…cant in this regression.
A check on the data suggests that the relative insigni…cance of the terms
of trade in this regression is the result of excluding countries from this
regression that lack government debt data but which have a strong terms
of trade e¤ect. The central bank independence index is insigni…cant in the
regression.17As in Table 6, the countries with non-autonomous exchange
rate policies are dropped from the sample in column (2), but the results
are very similar to those in column (1). In column (3), the countries
with annual average depreciation rates in excess of 30 percent are also
17This also holds true for all the speci…cations reported below.
19excluded. For this subsample, the growth e¤ect is less signi…cant and the
debt variable is no longer signi…cant. The latter result suggests that the
debt e¤ect is most important for high depreciation/in‡ation countries.
Column (4) replicates column (2), with the exclusion of countries
involved in wars or that experienced a large change in the black market
foreign exchange premium.18 The results are similar to those in columns
(1)-(2). Finally, the results for the OECD subsample are reported in
column (5). In addition to openness and size, debt also enters signi…cantly
in this regression but the ‘real’ variables — the output growth rate and
the terms of trade — are insigni…cant.
In summary, our model emphasized two kinds of determinants
of nominal exchange rates: variables that a¤ect the equilibrium long-run
in‡ation rate and variables that a¤ect the long-run real exchange rate. In
this section, we have reported evidence in support of both kinds of e¤ect
on the nominal exchange rate. Openness, size and the stock of nominal
government debt — variables that a¤ect the propensity to in‡ate — are
signi…cant in explaining the rate of nominal depreciation. However, the
evidence on central bank independence is weaker. The output growth rate
— which a¤ects the long-run in the real exchange rate — also is important
in explaining the nominal exchange rate. However, the results for the
terms of trade, another factor that ought a¤ect the nominal exchange rate
via its in‡uence on the real exchange rate, are mixed. For the OECD, and
consistent with the PPP evidence, the factors driving in‡ation appear to
dominate the determination of the nominal exchange rate.
18For this regression speci…cation, these two categories exactly match.
20E : The Real Exchange Rate
In this subsection, as an additional check on our approach, we
relate real exchange rate behavior to the output growth rate and the terms
of trade. Recall that, according to the arguments laid out in section
2, the reason why these variables are important for nominal exchange
rate depreciation is because they are important for real exchange rate
depreciation.
In column (1) of Table 8, we report the regression of the average
annual depreciation rate of the real exchange rate on the output growth
rate and the growth in the terms of trade. Both enter with the correct sign
but only the terms of trade is signi…cant. However, the lack of a signi…cant
growth rate e¤ect may be the result of data and other problems that lead
to mismeasurement of the real exchange rate for a number of countries.
Accordingly, in column (2), we exclude those countries which
had …xed exchange rates or were involved in a war during this period.
The probability of mislalignment is likely higher for countries with pegged
exchange rates, especially if a peg is maintained for political reasons, as
with the CFA zone in Africa. In fact, there is some post-sample evidence
in support of this argument: in January 1994, the CFA franc was devalued
by 100 percent against the French franc. Also in 1994, Surinam, which
had an o¢cial peg with the US dollar throughout the 1974-92 period,
underwent an even larger devaluation. The exclusion of warring countries
is done because of the likelihood of price controls in a war situation and
a concern about data quality for these countries. The results in column
(2) support a signi…cant role for both the growth rate and the terms of
21trade in real exchange rate determination. In column (3), countries that
experienced a large change in the black market foreign exchange premium
are additionally excluded, with similar results.
Finally, the sample is restricted to the OECD set of countries in
column (4). Both the growth rate and the terms of trade are signi…cant
in explaining variation in long-run real exchange rate movements in the
OECD and jointly explain 46 percent of the variation in the long-run real
exchange rate. This is consistent with the evidence of only a minor e¤ect
of these variables on the nominal exchange rate because the real exchange
rate displays relatively little variability in the OECD sample relative to
the variability of in‡ation, so that the determination of the long-run rate
of nominal exchange rate depreciation is dominated by in‡ation factors
for the OECD.
The evidence in Table 8, then, is consistent with the arguments
advanced in section 2.3. Finally, it ought to be noted that a large fraction
of the variation in the real exchange rate is not explained by the output
growth rate or the terms of trade. Identifying additional determinants
of long-run movements in real exchange rates is a potentially interesting
topic for future research.19
19Unfortunately quality data on some candidate variables — such as government
spending — are not generally available for a large number of the developing countries in
the sample. Engel (1996) suggests that di¤erences in the relative price levels of traded
goods across countries may lie behind movements in real exchange rates.
22Section IV: Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated some determinants of long-
runs in nominal exchange rates in a cross-section of countries. Our model
emphasized two kinds of determinants of nominal exchange rates: vari-
ables that a¤ect the equilibrium long-run in‡ation rate and variables that
a¤ect the long-run in the real exchange rate. We found evidence in support
of both kinds of e¤ect on the nominal exchange rate. Openness and the
stock of nominal government debt — variables that a¤ect the propensity
to in‡ate — are signi…cant in explaining the rate of nominal depreciation.
The evidence on other in‡ation variables, such as central bank indepen-
dence, country size, political instability and past in‡ation performance is
weaker. The output growth rate — which a¤ects the long-run in the real
exchange rate — also is important in explaining the nominal exchange
rate. However, the results for the terms of trade, another factor that
ought a¤ect the nominal exchange rate via its in‡uence on the real ex-
change rate, are mixed. For the OECD, the in‡ation factors dominate the
determination of the nominal exchange rate, although the real exchange
rate does signi…cantly vary with the output growth rate and the terms of
trade in this subsample. These …ndings broadly support the contention
in this paper that long-runs in nominal exchange rates can be related to
a set of characteristics that vary across countries.
In extending this work, there is considerable progress to be made
in achieving a better understanding of the determination of the real ex-
change rate. The evidence in Table 8 indicates that a large fraction of the
long-run variation in real exchange rates across countries remains to be
23explained. These limitations of the current study notwithstanding, the re-
sults of this paper suggest the potential fruitfulness for empirical analysis
of exchange rates from studying cross-sectional cross-country data.
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27Table 1: Summary Statistics
¼E ¼ Open G GTT Size
Mean .122 .171 .6462 .351 -.004 2.11
Median .043 .095 .5682 .45 -.0035 .011
Max. 1.317 .027 3.5063 3.01 .0152 230
Min. -.0489 .024 .0538 -1.92 -.0259 .0001
S.D. .227 .237 .4116 1.014 .007 21.5
N 144 109 133 117 125 114
Debt CBI ¼R BLK
Mean .2565 .353 .014 .019
Median .1987 .36 .012 0
Max. 1.552 .69 .151 1.866
Min. .0089 .14 -.088 -.195
S.D. .2242 .117 .031 .188
N 73 65 105 102
¼E is the average annual log change in the nominal exchange rate against
the US dollar over 1974-92. ¼ is the annual CPI in‡ation rate over 1974-
92. Open is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. G is the average
annual per capita output growth rate over 1974-92. GTT is the average
annual growth rate of the terms of trade. Size is total GDP (in billions
of international dollars) in 1974. Debt is the ratio of government debt to
GDP in 1975. CBI is the legal central bank independence index. ¼R is the
average annual change in the real exchange rate against the US price level
over 1974-92. BLK is the average annual change in the foreign exchange
black market premium over 1974-92. See the text (section 3.2) for sources.
28Table 2: Non-Autonomous Exchange Rates
Luxembourg Bahamas Barbados Belize
Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso Cameroon
Central African Republic Congo Cote d’Ivoire Djibouti
Dominica Grenada Iraq Kiribati
Lesotho Liberia Mali Niger
Panama St Kitts St Lucia St Vincent
Senegal Swaziland Syria Togo
Surinam Comoros Gabon
Classi…cation is based on the IMF Exchange Rate Arrangements and Prac-
tices and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995). The criterion for inclusion was a
unilateral peg to another currency for virtually the entire sample period
or membership of the CFA franc zone.
Table 3: Appreciating Countries
Country ¼E Country ¼E
Belgium/Luxembourg -.0047 Austria -.0228
Bahrain -.0009 Germany -.0223
Japan -.0489 Malta -.0002
Netherlands -.018 Neth. Antilles -.0003
Taiwan -.0223 Qatar -.0045
Switzerland -.0309 Seychelles -.0043
Singapore -.0189 UAE -.0045
Countries that experienced nominal appreciation against the US dollar
over 1974-92.
29Table 4: “High Depreciation” Countries
Country ¼E Country ¼E
Argentina 1.317 Bolivia .679
Brazil 1.179 Ghana .3398
Guinea-Bissau .3257 Israel .4687
Laos .432 Lebanon .3713
Mexico .3066 Nicaragua 1.2218
Peru .9753 Sierra Leone .357
Sudan .3312 Turkey .3565
Uganda .5413 Uruguay .425
Zaire .844 Zambia .3515
List of countries with average annual depreciation rates against the US
dollar in excess of 30 percent.
Table 5: PPP Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C -0.044 -0.048 -0.048 -0.041 -.06
(.0037) (.003) (.006) (.009) (.003)
D¼ 0.996 1.02 1.02 0.867 1
(0.015) (.019) (.075) (.12) (.01)
¹ R2 0.98 0.93 0.76 0.61 0.99
N 107 103 94 76 23
Dependent variable is average annual log change in the nominal exchange
rate against the US dollar. D¼ is the average annual in‡ation di¤erential
relative to the US. Standard errors are corrected using the McKinnon-
White procedure. The full sample is included in column (1). In column
(2), the countries with annual depreciation rates above 100 percent are also
dropped. In column (3), the countries with depreciation rates above 30
percent are also dropped. In column (4), the countries with depreciation
rates above 10 percent are also dropped. In column (5), the sample is the
set of OECD countries.
30Table 6: Benchmark Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C 0.76 1.11 0.47 1.14 0.76 1.74
(.33) (.43) (.15) (.38) (.43) (.5)
OPEN -0.16 -0.165 -0.036 -0.16 -0.13 -0.075
(.06) (.065) (.017) (.07) (.068) (.024)
SIZE 0.0002 -0.012 -0.01 -0.015 -0.005 -0.053
(.008) (.01) (.004) (.009) (.013) (.016)
G -5.97 -7.48 -2.63 -4.48 -4.8 -4.22
(2.44) (2.7) (.9) (1.77) (2.3) (5.4)
TT -10.32 -10.63 -2.53 -6.62 -11.98 8.35
(3.67) (3.91) (1.43) (3.55) (5.65) (7)
¹ R2 0.32 0.37 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.21
N 107 91 75 73 62 22
Dependent variable is average annual log change in the nominal exchange
rate against the US dollar. Standard errors are corrected using the
McKinnon-White procedure. The full sample is included in column (1). In
column (2), those countries with non-autonomous exchange rate policies
are excluded (see the list in Table 2). In column (3), the countries with
annual depreciation rates above 30 percent are also dropped. Column (4)
replicates column (2), but with the exclusion of countries involved in wars.
In column (5), countries that experienced large changes (greater than an
average 10 percent annually in absolute value) in the black market foreign
exchange premium are additionally excluded. The sample is restricted to
the OECD in column (6). See note to Table 1 for description of variables.
31Table 7: Extensions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C 2.03 2.19 1 1.77 1.6
(.65) (.62) (.3) (.46) (.46)
OPEN -0.24 -0.23 -0.063 -0.16 -0.12
(.1) (.09) (.019) (.05) (.038)
SIZE -0.04 -0.05 -0.027 -0.044 -0.045
(.016) (.016) (.009) (.013) (.013)
G -7.96 -7.65 -2.64 -6.6 -3.86
(3.19) (3.1) (1.4) (3.2) (6)
TT -3.31 -5.42 0.62 -5.1 5.4
(5.3) (6) (1.5) (4.2) (2.97)
DEBT 0.26 0.25 -0.018 0.28 0.24
(.066) (.069) (.04) (.05) (.05)
LCBI 0.25 0.21 -0.061 0.032 0.065
(.17) (.17) (.054) (.1) (.063)
¹ R2 0.46 0.48 0.33 0.62 0.74
N 45 43 35 34 21
Dependent variable is average annual log change in the nominal exchange
rate against the US dollar. Standard errors are corrected using the
McKinnon-White procedure. The full sample is included in column (1). In
column (2), those countries with non-autonomous exchange rate policies
are excluded (see the list in Table 2). In column (3), the countries with
annual depreciation rates above 30 percent are also dropped. Column (4)
replicates column (2), but with the exclusion of countries involved in wars
and countries that experienced large changes (greater than an average 10
percent annually in absolute value) in the black market foreign exchange
premium are additionally excluded. The sample is restricted to the OECD
in column (5). See note to Table 1 for description of variables.
32Table 8: Real Exchange Rate Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.012
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.005)
G -0.25 -1.03 -0.98 -1.8
(.46) (.41) (.48) (.66)
TT -1.16 -1.4 -1.72 -0.617
(.55) (.46) (.52) (.263)
¹ R2 0.05 0.28 0.31 0.46
N 92 62 56 22
Dependent variable is average annual log change in the real exchange rate
against the US dollar. Standard errors are corrected using the McKinnon-
White procedure. The full sample is included in column (1). In column
(2), countries with non-autonomous exchange rate regimes or involved
in wars are excluded. In column (3), countries that experienced large
changes (greater than an average 10 percent annually in absolute value)
in the black market foreign exchange premium are additionally excluded.
The sample is restricted to the OECD in column (4). See note to Table 1




















Fig. 1: Scatter of nominal depreciation against in‡ation di¤er-



















Fig. 2: Scatter of nominal depreciation against in‡ation di¤er-
ential over 1974-92 with exclusion of countries with depreciation






















Fig. 3: Scatter of nominal depreciation against in‡ation di¤er-


















Fig. 4: Scatter of depreciation rate of o¢cial exchange rate
against depreciation rate of black market exchange rate over
1974-92 for full sample.
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